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Abstract
The attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) is considered to be of particular
importance for emerging economies because it represents a channel through which inter-
national convergence in standards of living may be achieved. One important effect of FDI
is its impact on wages, both within the targeted firm (direct) and the local firms within the
same geographic region and sector (indirect). In this paper we investigate the question
whether multinational enterprises (MNEs) raise or lower wages directly and indirectly,
both theoretically and empirically. Importantly, the magnitude of these changes may de-
pend on how many firms in the sector are already foreign-owned. Generally, the effect
of MNEs on wages has not been studied as intensively in the international business (IB)
literature as other aspects of FDI, and ours is the first article to specifically investigate
the moderating effect of variation in foreign employment shares across industry-province
cells (clusters). Using Chinese data on 146,199 firms we estimate the direct wage effect
of foreign ownership to be positive and to increase with the employment share of foreign
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owned firms. We also find that the indirect effect on domestic wages varies with the
foreign share and may even turn negative.
Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment; Wage effects; Spillovers.
JEL Classification Numbers: F12, F16, F23, F61.
Acknowledgements: The authors would like to thank the editor, Rajneesh Narula, and
three anonymous referees for comments and suggestions that significantly improved the article.
In addition, we thank Jonathan Doh for extensive comments on earlier versions of this paper.
Financial support from the Leibniz Association through the Kiel Centre for Globalization is
gratefully acknowledged.
1 Introduction
Over the last two decades, a large literature has emerged that investigates performance dif-
ferentials between MNEs and local firms, and possible productivity spillovers to host country
firms (e.g., Chang, Chung & Moon, 2013a; Arnold and Javorcik, 2009; Liu, Siler, Wang &
Wei, 2000; Buckley, Clegg & Wang, 2002; Javorcik, 2004). The evidence shows that MNEs
are generally more productive than comparable domestic firms, in line with the idea of MNEs
possessing ownership advantages that allow them to overcome the additional costs of investing
abroad (Hymer, 1976, Dunning and Lundan, 2008). As the existence of such ownership ad-
vantages implies that there is a potential for productivity spillovers to domestic firms, a large
literature has developed to look for such effects. The evidence, however, is mixed but suggests
that such spillovers may happen especially in customer-supplier linkages (e.g., Meyer, 2004;
Görg & Greenaway, 2004).
In contrast to the extensive work on productivity effects, the implications of MNEs for wages
in host countries have drawn relatively little academic attention in the IB literature so far (a
notable exception being Clougherty, Gugler, Sørgard & Szücs, 2014). This is in spite of scholars
pointing to the importance of research on the effect of MNE presence on host country working
conditions in general and wages in particular (Wells, 1998; Meyer 2004; Haskel, Lawrence,
Leamer & Slaughter, 2012; Kobrin 2017). They emphasize the importance of understanding
all the consequences of an increased MNE presence especially in developing and emerging
economies that hope for a rapid ascension of the technology ladder.
In this paper, we focus on the effects of foreign owned MNEs on wages in the host country
economy. Importantly, we consider not only wages in the individual firm that may or may
not be foreign owned (what we term a direct effect), but also all of the remaining local firms
that may be indirectly affected through the presence of foreign MNEs (an indirect effect or
spillover). Providing a joint empirical framework for estimating these two effects is novel in
the literature and an important contribution of our paper. While a number of studies provide
evidence suggesting that foreign-owned firms pay higher wages than local firms (Conyon, Girma,
Thompson & Wright, 2002; Girma & Görg, 2007; Heyman, Sjöholm & Tingvall, 2007; Hijzen,
Martins, Schank & Upward, 2013) they are not concerned with estimating effects on wages of
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other local firms. On the other hand, studies like Clougherty, Gugler, Sørgard & Szücs (2014)
and Driffield and Girma (2003) look at the impact of the presence of MNEs on wages in locally
owned firms that are only indirectly impacted by the MNE’s activity, though they neglect what
happens to wages in firms that experience an influx of foreign ownership. Providing a framework
for estimating these two aspects of MNE presence jointly follows the call by Clougherty et al.
(2014) for empirical work on wage effects that moves beyond the focus on spillovers to consider
direct effects as well. In order to guide our empirical work, we construct a theoretical framework
that captures inherent differences between locally and foreign owned firms and features clusters
that include firms of both types.1
Standard theories of wage spillovers from MNEs generally consider two aspects (Görg &
Greenaway, 2004): Firstly, they assume that MNEs transfer technology to local firms (volun-
tarily or involuntarily, cf. Inkpen, Minbaeva & Tsang, 2019) which raises their productivity
and also wages. Secondly, if MNEs are in competition with local firms, market-stealing-effects
lead to lower output and productivity in domestic firms, yielding also lower wages as result.
However, critics may argue that MNEs, in particular when locating in transition or developing
economies, actively prevent the leakage of technology to local firms, thus reducing the potential
for spillovers; or may question whether MNEs and local firms are in direct competition on local
or foreign markets. One of the novelties of our theoretical model is that is shows that even in
the absence of such interactions (technology transfer or competition), we may still expect direct
as well as spillover effects to materialise, as an influx of MNEs changes the composition of the
stock of firms in an economy. We use the model and the complementary existing literature to
derive predictions for the direct and indirect wage effects. The direct wage effect, or foreign
wage premium, is expected to be positive, matching the findings of previous work (e.g. Lipsey
& Sjöholm, 2004). Our model features a human resources-specific advantage enjoyed by MNEs,
which results in more effective screening, better job matches between MNEs and workers, and
thus higher wages for workers. Another frequently given explanation for positive foreign wage
premia is the effort by an MNE to actively prevent spill-overs, that is they choose to pay higher
1A cluster in the empirical part of our paper is defined purely as an industry-region combination (e.g., the
food industry in the province of Shanghai) and is therefore somewhat different from the notion of business
clusters (as, e.g., espoused by Porter, 1990) where a cluster is a geographic combination of firms that are
interconnected.
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wages in order to prevent workers from leaving the firm and taking valuable know-how with
them (Fosfuri, Motta & Rønde, 2001, Glass & Saggi, 1999, 2002).
The indirect effect relates to the literature on spill-overs: the presence of positive produc-
tivity spill-overs to local firms in the same sector would indicate a positive indirect wage effect,
as well. Notwithstanding this argument, our model emphasizes a point of selection combined
with the composition of the targeted sector: As it is always the most productive local firms
that become foreign-owned (Chang at al., 2013a), the relative average productivity of the firms
that remain locally owned falls. If this mechanism outweighs potential positive effects due
to spillovers, the indirect wage effect could in fact be negative. Due to considerable ambigu-
ity regarding empirical evidence on the magnitude and direction of spill-over effects (Görg &
Greenaway, 2004, Meyer, 2004), we follow our model and indeed hypothesize the indirect wage
effect to be negative. Another novel aspect of our theoretical framework is that it allows us
to consider an additional aspect that has recently been shown to be important (Girma, Gong,
Görg & Lancheros, 2015a): all wage effects are likely to be mediated by the magnitude of
foreign presence in the relevant industry and region. In other words, the direct and indirect
wage effects on local firms are different in clusters that have a lower share of foreign presence
compared to those with higher shares.
In our empirical analysis we therefore go beyond the mere estimation of direct and indirect
(spillover) effects, and consider this empirically relevant source of heterogeneity that has not
yet been examined by the IB literature. The extent to which a sector is already subject to the
presence of foreign firms is likely to influence the way in which wage effects are transmitted.
Our model emphasizes the composition effect: the first firms becoming foreign-owned will not
be very different from their locally owned peers, so effects are modest. As the share of foreign
ownership increases, the differences become more marked and both wage effects increase in
magnitude (the direct effect turning more positive, the indirect effect more negative). We draw
on theories from the IB literature in addition to our model’s prediction to develop a set of
hypotheses regarding this contingency and how it modifies the wage effects.
Our empirical analysis uses manufacturing firm-level data from China. Our dataset is based
on the Annual Reports of Industrial Enterprise Statistics, compiled by the China National
Bureau of Statistics. We use information on 146,199 firms over the period 2003-2006. China
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is a highly relevant case to study given the importance of inward FDI to the economy. Since
its accession to the WTO in 2001, China has substantially liberalized policy towards direct
investment inflows in order to attract foreign investors (Chen, 2011; Long, 2005). In 2014, the
Chinese economy was host to about 10 percent of the global stock of foreign direct investment
and received 19 percent of world-wide FDI inflows (United Nations, 2015). Due to the high
number of geographic regions and industries covered, our Chinese data is particularly suitable
for investigating the moderating effect of differences in foreign presence.
Our empirical work needs to take selection on two levels into account: MNEs target firms
that are relatively more productive even before the influx of foreign capital, as well as locate
in advantageous areas (Meyer, 2004; Chang et al., 2013a; Girma et al., 2015a). Ignoring these
tendencies would expose our empirical estimation to endogeneity bias. The estimation method
is a multi-level application of propensity score matching methods (Hirano, Imbens & Ridder,
2003). It involves computing propensity scores and subsequently employing them as inverse
weights (Girma et al., 2015a). As a result, we can identify the causal effects of i) foreign own-
ership (by comparing a foreign-owned firm in a given cluster with an otherwise identical locally
owned firm in the same cluster) and ii) overall foreign presence in a cluster (by, for example,
comparing the average wage of a locally-owned firm in a cluster with zero foreign presence with
the average wage of an identical locally-owned firm in an otherwise identical cluster with 50 per-
cent foreign-owned firms). We estimate differing direct or indirect (spillover) effects depending
(possibly non-linearly) on the level of foreign presence in a well-defined industry-region cluster.
Furthermore, combining the estimated direct and indirect effects we can calculate a total effect
of MNEs on wages in the host country.
While our empirical approach is similar to that of Girma et al. (2015a), our analysis is novel
in that we focus on wage effects, while Girma et al. consider productivity spillovers. Also, our
theoretical framework is very different in that we highlight that wage effects may materialize
even in the absence of technology transfers due to compositional differences across clusters. Our
approach is therefore novel in both the IB and the economics literature on FDI wage effects.
In the next two sections we review the existing literature, present our theoretical framework
and derive our hypotheses using both existing IB theory as well as our own theoretical deriva-
tions. Section 4 describes the data and method, section 5 presents our results and section 6
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contains the concluding discussion of implications, limitations and future research.
2 Literature Review
The notion that MNEs have inherent advantages over their local competitors is well-developed.
Dunning’s classical eclectic paradigm points out the importance of ownership advantages to
allow foreign firms to overcome the liability of foreignness (Hymer, 1976, Dunning, 1977, Dun-
ning and Lundan, 2008). If a foreign MNE has valuable intangible assets or superior quality
processes and goods that give rise to such ownership advantages it stands to reason that they
will also have measurable advantages vis-à-vis their local competitors (Driffield & Love, 2007;
Narula & Driffield, 2012).
This has indeed been confirmed by numerous studies that have investigated systematic
differences in a large number of metrics, e.g. productivity, skill intensity, wages, or level of
innovation (e.g., Wang & Wang, 2015; Chang et al., 2013a, Arnold & Javorcik, 2009, Bandick
& Hansson, 2009; Girma & Görg, 2007; Rugman & Verbeke, 2001). These studies generally
conclude that MNEs are superior in their performance compared to local firms.2
The logical next step is to investigate the effects of attracting these advantaged MNEs
from the perspective of a host country. A multitude of channels by which MNEs can lift up
the host economy has been suggested, which can be broadly sorted into the broad categories
of knowledge/technology, employment and wages. These indirect benefits from the presence
of MNEs are often termed as spillovers, which may be voluntary or involuntary from the
perspective of the MNE.
Beginning with knowledge and technology, MNEs may share their advantages with the host
country via workers that acquire skills and subsequently leave to work at a locally owned firm
or start their own business (Martin & Salomon, 2003; Ben Hamida, 2013; Görg & Strobl,
2005a). Technological know-how is also transmitted via upstream linkages with local suppliers
(Giroud 2007, Jindra, Giroud & Scott-Kennel, 2009) or downstream linkages with customers
and distributors (Driffield, Munday & Roberts, 2002; Miozzo & Grimshaw, 2008; Godart &
2In addition to the positive view that MNEs have intrinsic advantages and subsequently transmit them
to their host countries to varying degrees, there are also critical views of their impact. To name just a few,
it has been suggested that MNEs damage the natural environment of their host countries, adopt unsafe and
exploitative work practices and harm local businesses through crowding out and ”unfair” competition (Oetzel
& Doh, 2009; Clapp & Dauvergne, 2011; Daly, 1993; De Backer & Sleuwagen, 2003; Haddad & Harrison, 1993).
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Görg, 2013; Newman, Rand, Talbot & Tarp, 2015). While these effects can be expected to
increase local firms’ productivity and technology (Liu et al., 2000; Buckley et al., 2002), MNEs
can also harm their local competitors as they take market share away from them, thus reducing
productivity (Aitken & Harrison, 1999; Görg & Greenaway, 2004).3
In terms of employment, benefits for local firms stem from increased competitiveness due to
spillovers, which allows them to expand operations and improve survival chances, while negative
competition effects may crowd out domestic employment (Görg & Strobl, 2005b; Sharma, 2018).
Improvements in technology would also be expected to raise the skill intensity of local firms
(Taylor & Driffield, 2005; Sharma, 2018). Vertical customer-supplier linkages can also boost
employment in local firms (Görg & Strobl, 2002). On the negative side, increased competition
with MNEs may lead to crowding out of domestic firms, thus reducing employment (DeBacker
and Sleuwaegen, 2003). Given the potential for employment generation, incentives provided
by host countries to attract MNEs are often computed in ’per-job’ terms, for example South
Carolina successfully attracted BMW to set up a new production facility in 1994 in part by
providing tax and other incentives amounting to around $68,421 per job (Woodward 1994;
Schweke, Rist & Dabson 1994, p.23)
Wage effects of MNEs have drawn relatively little academic attention in the IB literature so
far. Some recent studies in economics have examined whether foreign firms pay higher wages
than domestic firms (e.g., Hijzen et al., 2013, Heyman et al., 2007, Girma & Görg, 2007, Conyon
et al., 2002). To be more precise, the research has aimed to tease out a causal relationship
between foreign ownership and wages that is not driven by observable or unobservable firm
characteristics, but by ownership per se. A smaller literature has looked at the implications
of the presence of foreign MNEs on wages paid by domestic firms in the same industry (e.g.,
Aitken, Harrison & Lipsey, 1996, Lipsey & Sjöholm, 2004, Hale & Long, 2011, Clougherty et al.,
2014), so-called ”wage spillovers” or ”indirect wage effects”.4 However, none of these studies
consider the potential mediating effect of the overall foreign presence in a given cluster.
3Delving deeper into the conditions under which the positive effects are particularly strong, the literature
has shown that relevant factors include the absorptive capacity of the local firms (Ben Hamida 2013, Blalock
& Simon, 2009; Zanfei, 2012), the corporate culture of the multinational parent (Ha & Giroud, 2015; Jindra et
al., 2009) as well as the institutional environment of the host country (Giuliani & Macchi, 2013).
4The intuitive idea implicit in the existing studies on wage spillovers is that MNEs influence wages in domestic
firms through technology transfer or competition effects within the own industry.
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2.1 The moderating effect of established MNE presence
A moderator of the foreign wage premium that has been understudied in the IB literature
is the extent to which MNEs are already present in the targeted sector. Foreign investment
accumulates over time and, what is more, projects tend to geographically follow each other
due to agglomeration advantages (Barry, Görg & Strobl, 2003; Crozet, Mayer & Mucchielli,
2004, Tan & Meyer, 2011). However, it stands to reason that FDI has a differential impact
on an industry depending on whether the MNE in question is the very first one to enter
a sector previously populated exclusively by locally owned firms or only contributing to a
foreign presence that has already been substantial before its arrival. This effect has not yet
been investigated, but understanding it is of obvious interest for policy makers interested in
formulating a dynamic strategy to attracting foreign investment. Before we turn to the results
from our own theoretical framework, we draw on the existing literature to begin hypothesizing
on the moderating influence of already established foreign presence.
A large part of the literature considers the foreign wage premium to result from MNEs
paying their workforce premium wages to prevent the loss of firm-specific assets (FSA) (Ben
Hamida, 2013; Blomström & Kokko, 2002; Meyer, 2004; Sinani & Meyer, 2004). Insofar as
more MNEs being present implies that more technological know-how is already in the public
knowledge domain within the sector in question, one would expect the foreign wage premium
to decline as the share of foreign ownership increases.
An alternative explanation posits that MNEs seek out local employees who can help bridge
cultural or legal gaps due to superior knowledge of the business environment and the labor
market in the host country (Hashai & Buckley, 2014; Hijzen et al., 2013). There is empirical
support for this mechanism provided by Fortanier & Van Wijk (2010). As more MNEs enter,
the search for such talent would intensify, leading to a positive link between the foreign wage
premium and the share of foreign ownership.
The extant literature considers the link between higher MNE productivity (Dunning, 1988;
Rugman & Verbeke, 2001; Javorcik, 2014; Javorcik & Poelhekke, 2017) and higher MNE profits,
which, if shared with the work force, automatically imply higher MNE wages (Dunning, 1998;
Rugman & Verbeke, 2001; Budd, Konings & Slaughter, 2005; Helpman, Itskhoki & Redding,
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2010; Egger & Kreickemeier, 2013; Martins & Yang, 2015). In this case the link between
the extent of foreign presence and the wage premium relies on the question of just how much
productivity gain foreign ownership causes, and whether this effect is moderated by already
established MNEs.
Finally, one may also argue that spillovers depend on the extent of MNEs already estab-
lished. In terms of technology transfer, one may expect that to be highest when there are
only few MNEs established with its importance diminishing as more MNEs are present in an
industry or region. As to the negative competition effects due to market stealing, these may be
stronger (i.e., more adverse) the more MNEs are already established. This provides a natural
segue to our theoretical framework and hypothesis development.
3 Theory and Hypothesis Development
In order to complement the existing literature we present a novel theoretical framework in this
section. Its purpose is to provide context and inform our hypotheses regarding the direct and
indirect wage effects as well as their potential moderation by the magnitude of foreign presence.
While there are a number of theoretical approaches to explaining why foreign firms pay higher
wages focusing on very specific channels (e.g., Egger & Kreickemeier, 2013, Malchow-Møller,
Markusen & Schjerning, 2013), there is much less formal theory linking domestic firms’ wages to
the presence of foreign MNEs. An important exception is Clougherty, Gugler, Sørgard & Szücs
(2014), who model the impact of cross-border mergers on domestic firms. The two channels they
consider are a ”standard” positive productivity spillover (which generally raises wages) and a
bargaining effect that works through the local union losing negotiating power (which generally
lowers wages). Bargaining between the merger firm and unions can offset any positive spillover
effects on the outsider firm. However, none of the papers mentioned considers how the foreign
wage premium and the indirect wage effect are moderated by the presence of other MNEs in a
cluster.
We construct a framework that we regard as complementary to the existing literature, and,
indeed to Clougherty et al. The direct effect is fundamentally caused by an exogenous change
that is a result of a switch in ownership, as is the case in their model. However, we model clusters
to be made up of a large number of heterogeneous, monopolistically competitive firms. A switch
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in ownership now involves selection, whereby only the ”best” domestic firms switch ownership,
which affects the direct wage effect as well as the indirect wage effect. In other words, we show
that there may be indirect wage effects of foreign ownership even without specific assumptions
regarding the nature of spillovers to local firms, be they productivity gains, cost reductions or
changes in union bargaining power. To be clear, we are not claiming that those channels do
not matter. We are simply showing that a framework modeling the entire population of firms
leads to novel conclusions regarding the impact of cross-cluster differences in the magnitude of
foreign ownership on wage effects.
Constructing a tractable model that shines a light on certain aspects and details necessitates
abstractions and simplifications elsewhere. For example, our model is populated by firms that
are directly competing with each other within a specific sector, so vertical relationships such
as ’supplier-MNE parent’ linkages are absent. As a result, the model is necessarily silent about
vertical spillovers. In addition, the production technology only employs one type of labor, which
means that within-firm adjustments to the composition of its labor force are beyond the scope
of our analysis, as well.
3.1 Direct wage effect of foreign ownership
We consider the ‘direct’ effect to be the effect on firms receiving foreign ownership, i.e. the
foreign wage premium. The existing literature comes down strongly on the side of a positive
foreign wage premium (Almeida, 2007; Heyman et al. 2007; Chen, Ge & Lai 2011; Hijzen et
al. 2013), as does our model.
The details of our model are in the appendix. We study a wage ratio which describes the
direct effect on the marginal firm and compares the ’after’ to the ’before’ wage paid by a firm
with a given productivity level that switches from local to MNE (with the wages denoted
by wM and wL, respectively). Thus, the foreign wage premium for the marginal firm is given
by
wM
wL
=
(
cL
cM
)a
(1)
where cM and cL denote the cost for MNEs and local firms, respectively, of screening employees
as to their suitability for the job on offer. These are assumed to be lower for MNEs. a > 0
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is a constant that depends on underlying parameters and serves as a kind of elasticity.5 The
interpretation of equation (1) is straightforward: Given that the switch in ownership affects
the screening cost in our model, the relative wage is directly related to the relative screening
cost. The foreign wage premium in percentage terms is approximately equal to the percentage
reduction in screening costs multiplied with the elasticity a. For future reference we call this
effect the screening effect : a wage premium caused by more extensive job market screening by
foreign MNEs.
Next we study the effect on foreign owned firms in general. Mathematically we use the
average wage of foreign owned firms relative to the average wage of domestic firms, with averages
being denoted by bars. The expression is
w̄M
w̄L
=
(
cL
cM
)a
ρb
1 − ρb
(2)
where b > 0
and 0 < ρ =
θd
θ∗
< 1
The right hand side now is a product of two terms. The first one is already familiar from
expression (1), the screening effect. The second one contains another parameter-based constant,
b, which is also strictly positive. ρ is the ratio of the two productivities θd and θ∗, where the
first is the cut-off productivity at which a firm just enters production but remains locally owned
(so it is the lowest possible productivity draw while still allowing a firm positive profits, θd),
while the second is the cut-off where a firm is just indifferent between paying an extra fixed
cost to attract foreign investment or not, θ∗. It is this ratio that generates the result that the
extent of foreign ownership already present in the cluster influences the foreign wage premium.
See also Figure 1 for a graphical depiction of the firms’ entry and investment choices.
[ Figure 1 about here ]
The closer these two values are together, the smaller the number of operating firms that
are locally owned (relative to those that are MNEs). The further they are apart, the more
5In detail, the parameters influencing a consist of the shape parameter for the distribution of worker skills (a
Pareto distribution is assumed), the elasticity of substitution between varieties of the monopolistically produced
goods, the severity of diminishing returns of adding workers to production and the curvature of the screening
cost function.
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firms there are with a draw that causes them to produce locally only. Consequently, the share
of foreign ownership increases in ρ. We call this second term the composition effect because
it reflects the change in relative average productivity within the domestically owned and the
foreign owned firms caused by the shift in the underlying productivity thresholds. Panels (a)
and (b) of Figure 2 depict clusters with high ρ and MNE share and low ρ and MNE share,
respectively.6
[Figure 2 about here]
It is straightforward to formally check that the foreign wage premium expressed in (2)
increases in ρ, which leads us to our first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 All other things equal, the wage effect of foreign ownership on foreign owned
firms (the direct effect) is positive, and it increases with the share of firms that are already
foreign-owned in the sector.
As we discussed in Section 2.1. above, a similar hypothesis would emerge from a theoretical
framework in which MNEs pay a wage premium to poach local workers from their competitors
because of their superior local knowledge. The more MNEs are in the market, the higher
the market power of such local talent and, hence, the higher the wage premium. Our model
merely makes the point that such an outcome can also come about even in the absence of such
interactions between MNEs and local firms.
3.2 Indirect Effect on Locally-Owned Firms
Next, we turn to the impact of an increase in the number of foreign-owned firms on the average
wage paid by locally-owned firms, the indirect effect. Recall that our framework does not
make assumptions regarding linkages between firms, we do not take a stance regarding the
explicit nature of spill-overs. In contrast, Clougherty et al. (2014) model a situation where the
acquisition of an insider firm directly reduces the outsider firm’s costs. The authors assume
6Note that the kind of heterogeneous-firm model we use generally leads a host of firm-specific outcomes to
depend solely on the firm’s productivity draw (e.g. revenue, wage, job market screening threshold). So while a
higher productivity draw does lead to a higher wage, the causal chain is intricate and relies on the firm’s choice
of screening threshold when hiring its work force. In addition, foreign ownership per se improves the firm’s
human resources operations: at an identical level of productivity a foreign owned firm will hire a work force
with better matches and thus pay higher wages than a domestically owned firm.
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the presence of positive per-worker productivity spill-overs, which they convert into reductions
in non-wage costs in their framework (Clougherty et al., 2014, p. 454). As a result, they find
a positive spillover effect from cross-border mergers and acquisitions on the wage of outsider
firms, or a positive indirect effect in our parlance.
Another channel that has been proposed focuses on competition between the firms, either
in labor markets (e.g. Aitken et al., 1996, or Hale and Long, 2011) or in goods markets (e.g.
Lommerud, Straume & Sørgard, 2006). However, in our model workers are ex-ante identical,
so the fact that the average locally owned firm is left with a relatively lower quality work force
is not due to having lost all of the higher quality workers to MNEs, but instead due to poorer
screening by the firms resulting in lower quality matches.
In our framework, the indirect effect is about composition: As the productivity cut-off that
determines the magnitude of foreign presence in the sector falls, relatively more firms become
foreign-owned and relatively fewer remain locally owned. However, the underlying productivity
of any switching firm is not random: rather, it is always the one that before the switch was
the most productive firm among the locally owned ones, so the one that is most similar to
the already foreign-owned firms.7 For that reason, average productivity and thus average wage
of the locally owned firms fall. Put simply, if foreign acquisitions are picking cherries, the
remaining fruit will be those of ever lower quality. What is more, this effect strengthens as the
share of locally owned firms shrinks, which is due to the curvature of the underlying distribution,
which is a standard choice matching empirical firm size patterns.8
We again refer the reader interested in the mathematical details to the appendix, and
progress immediately to our second Hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 All other things equal, the wage effect of foreign ownership on locally owned
firms (the indirect effect) is negative, and it falls further with the share of firms that are already
foreign-owned in the sector.
Note that this indirect effect is strictly about averages, i.e. a comparison of the two groups
7This implication has support in the literature: Almeida (2007) finds that Portuguese firms that are acquired
by MNEs generally are very similar to the firms that are already foreign-owned.
8The Pareto distribution is widely used in New Trade Theory models in order to describe the distribution of
firms. It is chosen not only for its analytical tractability, but also because it has been shown to match empirical
patterns of firm size and revenue very well. See Axtell (2001) or Helpman et al. (2004).
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of firms with different ownership. The negative sign is caused by changes in composition, but
at the firm-level only the marginal firm switches to a higher screening threshold as a result
of being acquired. Since we did not model a direct link between a foreign acquisition in the
industry and a non-involved firm’s production technology or costs, an individual local firm’s
wage level would be unchanged.
Alternatively, such a hypothesis may also be supported by a model assuming that a larger
presence of MNEs leads to stronger competition and market stealing effects. This would reduce
productivity and thus wages of domestic firms and the more so the more MNEs are already
established.
Our model, by necessity, abstracts from other issues in order to highlight the novel aspect
of composition. In the real world many factors affect the influx of foreign capital into a firm,
industry or region. Firm characteristics play a role here, as well as institutional set up and
industrial policies impacting an industry or region. Moreover, firm characteristics also affect
wage determination. While a detailed treatment of these issues would make the theoretical
model too complex, we make an attempt at controlling for some of these aspects in our empirical
analysis, where we model the influx of FDI into an industry / region and the determinants of
firm level wages.
4 Data Description
In order to estimate direct and indirect wage effects empirically, we draw on firm level panel
data from the Chinese manufacturing industry. The dataset is based on the Annual Reports
of Industrial Enterprise Statistics, compiled by the China National Bureau of Statistics. The
dataset covers all firms in China with an annual turnover of more than 5 million Renminbi
(about $800,000). These companies account for an estimated 85–90 percent of total output in
most industries. For the purpose of this analysis, we have information on 146,199 firms over
the period 2003-2006.9
We estimate the effect of a firm having received foreign investment in 2005, which we refer to
9While this time period reflects data availability it also coincides with important changes in China’s FDI lib-
eralization policy following its accession to the WTO in 2001. These changes were implemented in 2002 and sub-
stantially increased the number of industries open to foreign investment. They also removed WTO-incompatible
requirements on industries such as requiring exporting a stipulated percentage of the goods produced within
China (Chen, 2011; Long, 2005).
15
as our ”treatment”. A firm is deemed to have foreign ownership if foreign investment accounts
for at least 10 percent of firms’ paid-up capital. This capital inflow may be due to acquisitions
or joint ventures. Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to distinguish these two modes. Of
the foreign-owned firms in our data set, 18% are wholly-foreign owned and 57% are majority-
foreign owned. Our data does not capture wholly-owned greenfield investment. However, this
is unlikely to be an important omission because in China investment with a domestic partner
is frequently a condition of being granted market entry to foreign firms in many industries and
regions (Jiang, Keller, Qiu & Ridley, 2018).
The choice of treatment year is purely pragmatic, as it provides us with information on
both pre-treatment (2003-2004) and post-treatment (2006) years. The outcome variable is the
average wage measured in 2006 relative to its pre-treatment (i.e. 2004) values. This differencing
helps remove bias due to time invariant firm-specific unobservable effects (Girma & Görg, 2007;
Arnold & Javorcik, 2009).
The main novelty of our paper is to allow for externalities from foreign ownership within
a well-defined cluster. We define r = 1...R sufficiently heterogeneous economic clusters. Our
underlying assumption is that interactions between firms in the same cluster are far more im-
portant than any potential inter-cluster interaction. This assumption is supported by empirical
findings in the literature that spillovers are strongest within particular regions or a broad set
of industries (e.g., Driffield & Girma, 2003). Note that in our empirical analysis we only need
to assume that this holds in the short run. In other words, in the short run, intra-cluster in-
teraction is more important than inter-cluster interaction. This does not appear unreasonable,
especially in China where inter-regional labor mobility is somewhat impeded by the Hokou
system (Chan, 2013).
The empirical construction of clusters is not an exact science. Ideally, clusters should be
constructed in such a way as to maximize the potential of intra-cluster spillovers, while at the
same time minimize possible inter-cluster externalities. In doing so, one would need to strike
a balance between having a large enough number of clusters and sufficient observations per
cluster. In this paper we classify firms into clusters based on the intersection of 11 geographic
areas and 13 industry groupings.10 We impose the condition that at least 4% of firms in a
10In the data set firms are originally grouped in terms of four digit industry codes. Based on these we assign
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cluster should be foreign-invested and the total number of firms should not be less than 100.
For this reason we have to leave out 16 clusters from the analysis, leaving us with a total
of R = 127 clusters.11 We also report below robustness checks using different definitions of
clusters.
Table 1 provides the definition and summary statistics of pre-treatment covariates by foreign
ownership status. Perhaps not surprisingly, the raw data suggest that foreign firms tend to
be larger, more productive and pay higher average wages compared to their domestically-
owned counterparts. Hence, it is important to control for these firm level characteristics in our
estimation in order to address selection at the firm level and differences in wage setting across
firms.
[Table 1 here]
Table 2 provides some summary statistics of the cluster level variables. Average share of foreign
firms in 2005 was 21.1% with an interquartile range value of 17.1% suggesting quite substantial
inter-cluster heterogeneity.12 We also see that there are differences across clusters in terms of
wage levels and growth, average firm size and age, export activitiy, taxes, benefits to workers
and the importance of state-owned enterprises. These may reflect institutional and policy
differences across clusters that may also determine foreign capital inflows. These are controlled
for in the empirical analysis.
Table 3 shows that the proportion of foreign firms and their employment share have both
significant (unconditional) correlations with all of the cluster level variables. This indicates the
importance of controlling for cluster level differences in the empirical analysis.
[Tables 2 – 3 here]
them to the 13 industry groupings which roughly correspond to two digit industries. Note that, in 2004, almost
90 percent of firms report that they only produce a single product.
11Table A1 in the appendix lists the geographic and industry groups which underpin our cluster formation;
while Table A2 gives the employment share of foreign firms and the share of foreign firms s in the top and
bottom 10 FDI attracting clusters.
12Recall that our dataset covers the universe of large firms but does not include all small firms. This should
not bias our measure of foreign presence in a cluster, as foreign owned MNEs are generally large firms which
are included in our dataset.
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5 Empirical Methodology
The aim of the empirical exercise is to estimate direct and indirect effects of MNEs on wages
that potentially differ depending on the level of foreign ownership in a cluster. It is well known
that MNEs neither acquire foreign firms nor choose locations randomly. Instead, a cherry-
picking pattern has been documented: MNEs target firms that are relatively more productive
even before the take-over, as well as locate in advantageous areas (Meyer, 2004; Chang et al.,
2013a; Girma, Gong, Görg & Lancheros, 2015b). Note that this poses a potential empirical
problem when we strive to measure the firm-specific effect of foreign ownership and the cluster-
specific effect of the foreign share per se (Chang, Chung & Moon, 2013b). If, for example, a
researcher was to find that a larger foreign presence corresponds to higher wages the result may
simply be caused by the fact that foreign investors chose clusters with attractive features (e.g.,
better-educated work-force, lower taxes), which in turn are correlated with higher wage levels.
In that case, foreign presence per se may not have any effect on wages at all. Hence, controlling
for selection at firm and cluster level is essential, as was also indicated by our descriptives.
In order to deal with these two levels of selection, our empirical approach proceeds in
two steps (see Girma et al. 2015a for a more detailed description). We firstly estimate the
relationship between foreign ownership and wages separately for each cluster, using data at the
firm level. In a second step we take into account the presence of MNEs as treatment, using
data at the cluster level.13
5.1 First step estimation
We estimate the relationship between foreign ownership and wages separately for each of the
127 clusters. We define a binary treatment variable dir = 1 if firm i in cluster r receives foreign
investment in 2005 and dir = 0 if not. This treatment variable is then used as independent
variable in a wage regression using the firm level data for a given cluster. In order to take into
account selection at the firm level, we estimate the outcome equation using inverse propensity-
score weighted regression and controlling for the pre-treatment covariates (Bang & Robins,
13We also followed a much simpler estimation approach that ignores the multi-level selection problems. Using
OLS and interacted variables to explore the effect of foreign presence on the wage premium, we find the results
to be qualitatively similar to those reported below. The paper does not contain that analysis for the sake of
brevity, but all of the results are available from the authors.
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2005, Hirano et al., 2003). Note that the outcome variable, the firm-level wage is defined as
the change relative to the treatment period, akin to using a difference-in-differences strategy
combined with propensity score matching.14
For each cluster, this implies that we firstly generate the firm-specific propensity-scores
of being treated via a logistic regression with a rich list of pre-treatment covariates subject
to balancing conditions being satisfied. The list and precise definition of the pre-treatment
covariates can be found in Table 1. Results are reported in Table A3 in the appendix. As
we have 127 propensity score estimations, we report summary statistics for the estimated
coefficients. These corroborate the pattern suggested in Table 3 – productivity, wages, size and
export activity are positively correlated with foreign ownership. The last column of Table A3
also shows that propensity score conditioning has done a remarkably good job at balancing
firm level observable covariates across the two groups of firms.15
Using the obtained propensity scores we then estimate the following outcome equation by
cluster via inverse probability weighted regression:
wis = α + βdis + F (X; δ) + error; i = 1...N. (3)
where w is defined as the change in the firm level wage and F (.) represents a function of pre-
treatment covariates vector X.16 From the regressions we can then calculate the cluster specific
potential outcomes for the average treated (1) and non-treated (0) firm in a given cluster with
foreign presence s as predicted from the regression
w̄1s =
1
N
N∑
i=1
[α̂ + β̂ + F (X; δ)] and w̄0s =
1
N
N∑
i=1
[α̂ + F (X; δ)] (4)
14The estimator is “doubly robust” as it provides two opportunities to adjust for selection on observables by
combining inverse probability reweighting with regression covariates adjustment. Our identifying assumption
is, of course, selection on observables. To the extent that there are unobservables that are correlated with both
the treatment conditional on observables and the change in wages, our results would potentially be biased.
15Cluster-by-cluster estimation allows for complete heterogeneity across clusters. As a robustness check, we
also estimate a pooled propensity score, which provides results that are very similar. Furthermore, in another
robustness checks, we allow for a further lag of the covariates in the propensity score. Again, this does not
change results substantially. Results are not reported here to save space but are available upon request.
16In the inverse probability weighting, treated firms receive a weight of 1/p and non-treated firms 1/(1 − p).
In Table A4 we present summary statistics of estimated coefficients from the 127 regressions. We impose the
common support condition to ensure that the propensity score is balanced across domestic and foreign firms.
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The average difference between the two potential outcomes in (4) would be an estimate of
the average treatment effect if the cluster-specific level of foreign presence did not matter. In
order to investigate whether there is a causal relationship between the cluster specific level of
foreign presence and the cluster specific wage effects, we now turn to the second step estimation.
5.2 Second step estimation
In the second step of the analysis we treat w̄1s and w̄
0
s estimated in the first step as the “outcome”
variables, and consider the cluster level foreign presence as the ”treatment” variable. We
approximate the cluster level foreign presence using the proportion of foreign firms in the
cluster. This is defined as sr =
Nr
N
, with Nr being the number of MNEs and N being the total
cluster level number of firms.
A complication arises from the fact that this cluster level ”treatment” variable is continuous
between 0 and 1. In order to control for selection at the cluster level, we employ the causal
inference approach for continuous treatments (Hirano & Imbens, 2004). A key result from
this literature is that causal inference can be conducted by conditioning on the generalized
propensity score (GPS), which is essentially the conditional density of the treatment given
some pre-treatment balancing covariates.
We generate the GPS conditional on pre-treatment cluster level covariates, Ĝr, using the
fractional logit model (Papke & Wooldridge, 1996). A full list of these cluster level variables
can be found in Table 2. Marginal effects from the fractional logit model and the accompanying
covariate balancing tests are reported in Table A5 in the appendix. In line with the correlations
in Table 3, we find that the share of foreign firms is higher in clusters with higher average wages,
lower average age of firms, lower tax rate and a higher number of foreign owned firms. We also
report results from covariate balancing test in this second step estimation in the final two
columns.17 We show the average p-values from these tests, and it is reassuring to see that
conditioning on GPS has done a very good job at covariate balancing.
17In order to check for covariate balancing conditional on generalized propensity scores (GPS), we adopt the
blocking approach proposed by Hirano and Imbens (2004). Accordingly we first divide clusters into 3 discrete
groups defined by treatment intensity (i.e., employment share of foreign firms), and then create 5 blocks within
each such group based on the estimated GPS quintiles. Within each block, we carry out difference-in-means
tests between a treatment intensity group and the other two groups combined by conditioning on the GPS.
This process is repeated for each of the 3 treatment intensity groups and 9 covariates, entailing a total of 135
balancing tests.
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We then calculate cluster level potential outcomes conditional on Ĝr and sr using polynomial
approximation as suggested by Hirano and Imbens (2004). We use a quadratic approximation
over R cluster:18
w̄dr =
1
R
R∑
r=1
(β̂0 + β̂1Ĝr + β̂2sr + β̂3Ĝrsr + β̂4Ĝ
2
r + β̂5s
2
r) (5)
Subsequently we calculate the predicted values w̄dr for the two firm level treatments d and the
continuous cluster-level treatment sr.
Using these predicted values as potential outcomes, we can then calculate various treatment
effects, using insights from the recent statistical literature (e.g. Hudgens & Halloran, 2008).
Firstly, we can calculate a direct wage effect γ̄10ss = w̄
1
s − w̄0s as the difference in wages between
foreign-owned (1) and domestic (0) firms for a given level of foreign presence s in a cluster.
The indirect wage effect is defined as γ̄00s0 = w̄
0
s − w̄00, hence, the difference in wages between
domestic firms (0) in a cluster with foreign presence level s and in a cluster without any foreign
presence. Based on these two treatment effects, we can calculate a so-called total wage effect
as γ̄10s0 = w̄
1
s − w̄00, which gives an estimate of the wage premium for a foreign firm in a specific
cluster with foreign presence s compared to a domestic firm in a cluster with no foreign presence.
Note that the total effect can be directly calculated as the sum of direct and indirect effects.
6 Discussion of Results
The direct and indirect effects can be calculated for any level of foreign presence in a cluster
by using equation (5). Since the presentation of all treatment effects in a single table is not
practical, we instead plot all estimated direct and indirect wage effects of foreign ownership
along with their 95% confidence intervals in Figure 3. We find that the share of MNEs in a
cluster matters significantly, both statistically and economically.19
[Figure 3 here]
Our first finding is that the direct wage effect, i.e. the wage premium due to being an MNE
18Note that individual parameters from such polynomial approximations do not have any behavioral inter-
pretation (Hirano and Imbens, 2004).
19The interested reader may find a table with estimates and confidence intervals at select levels of MNE
presence in the appendix (Table A6).
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compared to a local firm, is always positive. This is in line with the literature on wage premia
of MNEs, which also established positive wage differences between MNEs and local firms for
a number of countries (e.g., Hijzen et al., 2013; Girma and Görg, 2007; Heyman et al., 2007).
A more novel result is that we also find that the premium differs strongly as one varies the
share of MNEs in a cluster. The higher is the presence of MNEs in a cluster, the higher is the
difference between the wages paid by MNEs compared to domestic firms. This is in line with
Hypothesis 1. The finding may be due to the mechanism highlighted in our theoretical model,
namely selection of the best local firms as targets, which becomes more important the more
foreign MNEs are already present in a cluster. It could also reflect that MNEs hire workers
from local firms, leading to a wage premium (Fortanier & van Wijk, 2010). This premium may
increase with existing foreign presence, as the search for local talent becomes harder and more
costly the more foreign MNEs are already in the market. Unfortunately, our data do not allow
us to discriminate between these two hypotheses.
The second panel of Figure 3 depicts the indirect effect, i.e., the impact the presence of
MNEs has on wages in domestic firms. We find that this spillover effect is small but positive
and statistically significant for low levels of foreign presence in a cluster. Only for clusters with
above average foreign presence (which stands at about 21 percent in the data) do they turn
significantly negative. This negative effect becomes stronger the larger the foreign presence in
the cluster.
Our theoretical model predicts that indirect effects should be negative and more so the
higher is the presence of foreign firms in a cluster due to the changing composition of the
pool of local firms in a cluster. A similar expectation would emerge from assuming negative
competition effects from MNEs on domestic firms (Aitken et al., 1996; Meyer, 2004), which
would also become stronger as MNE presence increases in a cluster. Such negative effects only
apply, though, when foreign presence is comparatively high in a cluster.
For low levels of MNE presence positive indirect effects prevail, i.e., local firms increase their
wages due to increasing presence of MNEs in a cluster. We may interpret this as indicating
positive wage spillovers on domestic firms if the presence of foreign firms is not too high. This
is in line with evidence for positive wage spillovers in Clougherty et al. (2014) and Driffield &
Girma (2003), although these studies do not allow the spillover effect to vary depending on the
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level of MNE presence in a cluster.
In line with our hypotheses, we have seen that the direct wage effect of MNEs increases
while the indirect effect decreases uniformly with the degree of foreign presence in the cluster.
From a policy point of view one may wonder whether there is an ”optimal presence” of MNEs
in the sense that the economy-wide wage effect of foreign ownership is maximized. By summing
the direct and indirect effects we can calculate a total wage effect, which is shown in Figure 4.
[Figure 4 here]
This total wage effect is always positive but has an inverted u-shape in relation to the share
of foreign presence, reaching its maximum value when the share of MNEs is around 25 percent.
At this level of foreign presence, the total foreign ownership wage effect stands at about 22
percent. In other words, the wage paid by the average MNE in a cluster with an MNE share
of around 25 percent is about 22 percent higher than that paid by the average domestic firm
in a cluster with no MNEs.
We defined our measure of foreign presence based on the number of MNEs, matching the
spirit of our theoretical framework and the measure used by Clougherty et al. (2014). As a
robustness check, we also consider the employment share in MNEs as an alternative measure.
This is defined as sr =
Lr
L
=
∑N
i dir∗empir
L
, with dir being the foreign ownership indicator, L
being total cluster level employment and empir employment in firm i situated in cluster r. This
definition is similar to what is usually used in the literature on wage spillovers (e.g. Aitken at
al., 1996; Driffield & Girma, 2003). The estimated different wage effects are plotted in Figure
5 and they are consistent with the results discussed earlier.
[Figure 5 here]
As additional robustness checks, we examine the sensitivity of our results to the precise defini-
tion of cluster. In particular, we re-define clusters to be i) one of 169 towns or ii) one of 145
three-digit SIC industries. While modification i) leaves our main results essentially intact, the
removal of the geographic component by defining clusters at a very disaggregated industry-level
in ii) leads to a weakening of the effect of foreign presence on the wage premium. We carefully
interpret this finding as support for our interpretation that local labour market effects are im-
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portant for the impact of foreign presence on wage levels. These results are not reported here
to save space, but are available upon request.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we implement an approach which allows us to estimate direct and indirect effects
of foreign ownership on wages in a unified framework. Our analysis allows for differences in
effects depending on the strength of the presence by foreign firms in a well-defined cluster. It
also takes into account selection at both the firm and the cluster level.
Our paper adds to the theoretical understanding of such wage effects with a simple model
where we do not assume that MNEs and domestic firms interact through technology transfers
or competition. Rather, MNEs differ in terms of having a “better” matching methodology with
lower screening costs compared to domestic firms. This can explain why they are able to pay
higher wages. In our framework, foreign presence also affects average wages of domestic firms
because of selection, whereby only the least productive domestic firms (which pay low wages)
remain domestic while other firms get taken over by foreign owners.
The empirical analysis uses firm level data from China. Results show that there are positive
direct effects of foreign ownership – foreign firms pay higher wages – and that the estimated
effects increase with increasing presence of MNEs in a cluster. We also find that the spillover
effect on domestic wages varies with the strength of MNE presence in a cluster. For low levels
of foreign presence the estimated effect is low but positive, while it turns increasingly negative
once the presence of foreign firms is higher than about 20 percent. Combining the estimated
direct and indirect effects, we find that the total effect of foreign ownership on wages is positive
and depends non-linearly on the level of foreign presence. Its maximum is at a level of foreign
presence of around 25 percent: The wage paid by an MNE in a cluster with a 25 percent level
of foreign presence is 22 percent higher than the wage paid by the average domestic firm in a
cluster with no foreign presence.
As Oetzel and Doh (2009) point out, managers need to keep an eye on the implications
of their activities for economic development, as they ”increasingly operate at the will of the
local communities” (p. 115) in which they are located. Furthermore, research on corporate
social responsibility suggests that consumers in the MNEs’ home countries worry about the
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treatment of host country workers by the MNE (Boehe & Cruz, 2010). Therefore, managers
ought to understand their firm’s impact on local labor markets as well as the composition of
firms already operating in the markets they enter.
Our empirical results suggest that the presence of MNEs may negatively influence the wages
of local firms within the same industry. It stands to reason that this would be concerning
for host country governments and thus complicate MNE operations. Competition effects in
both output and labor markets may exacerbate negative consequences for local firms. On the
other hand, we estimate direct wage effects to be positive and to increase with the strength
of MNE presence. This may reflect any of the various MNE advantages discussed in the
literature, including the human resources management advantages we model in the present
paper. Knowing these opposite effects is helpful for MNE management when negotiating with
host country institutions. For the host country government, potential policy implications are
two-fold: On the one hand, the attraction of MNEs is beneficial in that it brings better-paying
jobs alongside with technological know-how into the country. However, our results suggest
that a balance between foreign-owned firms and locally owned firms in a given sector may be
optimal. Too low a share and you run danger of leaving benefits arising from better management
techniques on the table. Too high a share and you may allow the local stock of firms in the
sector to become too picked-over and unproductive.
While our theoretical framework focuses on labor market advantages and industry com-
position, our empirical analysis cannot disentangle the various theoretical channels which may
stand behind the wage effects that we document. Future work should address this issue, thereby
providing further valuable information to managers negotiating with host governments and ex-
plaining their global impact to stakeholders - as well as government officials who find themselves
pondering what type and how many multinationals to encourage (or allow) to take control of
local firms.
One limitation of our analysis of spillovers is that we only look at horizontal effects taking
place in the same industry. While this is also true for other work in the IB literature on
wage effects of FDI, the related literature on productivity spillovers highlights that technology
transfer is most likely when there are vertical customer-supplier linkages between industries
(Driffield, Munday & Roberts, 2002; Javorcik, 2004; Godart & Görg, 2013). While our empirical
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definition of an industry is arguably broad enough to accommodate some customer-supplier
industry linkages, a full treatment of vertical linkages is beyond the scope of this paper.
Furthermore, with our data we can only analyse what happens to average wages in the
firm. While our theoretical model does not consider a reallocation of workers within or across
firms, changes in wages can of course stem from different adjustment processes: firstly, firms
pay higher or lower wages to their existing staff, or secondly, firms can hire workers with
different skill profiles, adjusting the labour force towards more skilled or unskilled workers.
A full treatment of this question would necessitate linked employer-employee data (as in, eg.,
Hijzen et al., 2013). While Hijzen et al. find that the largest direct wage effects of MNE are
due to newly hired workers, we unfortunately do not have such detailed data available and need
to leave this question for further research.
The empirical analysis is carried out with firm level data for China only. Still, the results
may also give some indicative ideas regarding the wage effect of MNEs for other developing and
emerging economies. Direct effects can be expected to be positive in other countries as well,
given the global evidence on productivity premia of MNEs (Chang et al., 2013b; Harrison &
Scorse, 2010). Recall that at the core of our theoretical mechanism is a built-in human resources
advantage by the MNE, which is not host-country specific. However, one would conjecture that
this advantage varies with the idiosyncracies of labor markets across host economies, which
would directly influence the foreign wage premium. Previous work has estimated productivity
spillovers to be negative for a variety of countries, suggesting that the negative indirect wage
effects we have documented may also be found elsewhere (Meyer & Sinani, 2009). The compo-
sitional effect, which in our model implies that the strength of the effects depend on the level
of foreign presence should thus be applicable in other countries, also. An important condition
would be the size of the clusters the MNEs invest in. Our mechanism requires a non-neglible
mass of both foreign owned and locally owned firms to be present in the market in order for
MNE selection to have the demonstrated effect.
Of course, in order to validate these conjectures, one would need further analyses with data
for other countries. We hope that our paper highlights the potential insights one could gain
from implementing this approach. They may prove very useful for policy makers who aim at
maximizing the potential from inward foreign direct investment for their country, as well as for
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MNE managers who wish to understand the impact of their investments and involvement on
host economies.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium with MNEs and locally owned firms
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Figure 2: Differences in MNE shares across clusters
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Figure 3: Causal effects of FDI on wages at foreign and domestic firms
Figure 4: Total treatment effects of FDI on wages
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Figure 5: Treatment effects based on employment shares of FDI firms in cluster
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Table 2: Summary statistics of cluster level variables
Variable Mean S.D. Interquartile
range
Min Max
Proportion of foreign
firms
0.211 0.120 0.171 0.045 0.556
Productivity 4.047 0.329 0.453 3.322 4.988
Productivity growth 0.211 0.153 0.135 -0.049 1.429
Wage 2.500 0.280 0.390 1.998 3.271
Wage growth 0.171 0.079 0.101 0.042 0.702
Size 8.520 0.439 0.450 7.788 10.041
Age 2.006 0.175 0.191 1.218 2.510
Exports 0.234 0.128 0.168 0 0.610
Tax 0.225 0.219 0.195 -0.930 0.939
Benefit (log of cluster
average benefit)
-4.613 0.582 0.503 -5.691 -1.946
Share of state-owned
firms
0.093 0.062 0.096 0.006 0.247
Log of number of for-
eign firms in province
5.077 1.209 1.648 2.303 8.148
Number of clusters 127
Note:
(i) All variables except total number of foreign firms in region are defined as cluster-level averages.
(ii) All variables except proportion of foreign firms are measured in the pre-treatment year of 2003.
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A Theoretical Appendix
To illustrate the mechanisms at work we focus on one country with a continuum of risk neutral workers. The
standard setup of CES-preferences with monopolistic competition in the final good market yields the following
expression for equilibrium revenue of a firm producing variety j.
r(j) = Aq(j)β with 0 < β < 1 (A.1)
where
A = E1−βP β
is a demand factor exogenous to the firm and 1/(1− β) is the elasticity of substitution between varieties. Total
expenditures on differentiated goods are given by E and the price index for differentiated goods is given by P .
Furthermore, demand for good j from (A.1) is
q(j) = A
1
1−β p(j)
−1
1−β
There is a fixed entry cost that firms have to pay in order to remain in the market given by fe. Firm productivity
is determined by a draw of the parameter θ, and the distribution is Pareto with the shape parameter given by
z. As mentioned above, a second set of fixed costs determines the firm’s ownership. Here, the firms face the
following choice: either they choose a lower profile which results only in the usual market entry costs of fd but
also implies that the firm will not be able to partner up with an MNE. Or the firm pays fd plus an additional
fixed cost fm and, as a result, becomes attractive to multinational corporations and is consequently acquired.
20
A firm’s output depends on its productivity θ, a measure of workers hired h and the average ability of those
workers ā:
y = θhγ ā
Just as in Helpman et al. (2010), firms begin the hiring process by posting vacancies. The workers that are
subsequently matched with the firm are subject to screening. Upon being interviewed, each worker draws a
match-specific ability parameter a, which is also assumed to be distributed Pareto with shape parameter k.21
The firms choose a level of screening effort by setting a threshold ac . Workers with a match-specific productivity
below ac will be recognized and not hired. Screening costs increase in ac and also differ depending on whether
the firm is part of an MNE or not. Screening costs are given by
cLa
δ
c
δ and
cMa
δ
c
δ for locally owned and foreign-
20Note that we model the difference between foreign- owned and domestically owned firms only insofar as it
relates to the labor market. The firm’s decision whether to incur the additional fixed cost fm will hence solely
depend on the benefits it gets from lower screening costs.
21Throughout we assume that 0 < γk < 1 in order to ensure that firms have an incentive to screen (see
Helpman et al. (2010) for discussion). Intuitively, firms may find it disadvantageous to screen if i) the importance
of number of workers relative to their (average) productivity level in the production function is high (high γ)
and ii) there is low dispersion of match-specific productivity levels (high k).
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owned firms, respectively, where cL > cM > 0 and δ > 0. One can show that a firm sampling n workers and
choosing screening intensity ac ends up with a measure of workers given by
h = n
(
amin
ac
)k
(A.2)
and average ability of the hired workers is given by
ā = k
ac
k − 1
Note that amin is the minimum of the support for the Pareto distribution of the match-specific productivity
draws by workers.
The firm maximizes profit given by
π(θ) = max
n≥0,ac≥amin,Im∈{0,1}
1
1 + γβ
A(κyθn
γa1−γkc )
β − bn− (1 − Im)
cLa
δ
δ
− Im
cMa
δ
δ
− fd − Imfm
Here κy =
k
k−1a
γk
min is a constant and b is the cost of sampling one worker. The firm chooses the number of
workers to sample n, the screening threshold ac and whether to invest in being acquired by an MNE or not.
Note that the factor 11+βγ is a result of bargaining with the workers: it represents the share of revenue that
the firm obtains. We continue with the case of the locally owned firm (Im = 0). The first-order conditions are
given by
β(1 − γk)
1 + βγ
r(θ) = cLac(θ)
δ
and
βγ
1 + βγ
r(θ) = bn(θ).
Here we used the fact that the firm’s revenue is given by r(θ) = A(κyθn
γa1−γkc )
β . The total wage bill w(θ)h(θ)
is a constant fraction of firm revenue, so we derive
w(θ) =
βγ
1 + βγ
r(θ)
h(θ)
= bn(θ)/h(θ) = b
(
ac(θ)
amin
)k
,
using the second first-order condition as well as (A.2). In addition, we can solve for the screening threshold and
the number of sampled workers:
ac(θ) =
(
Aβ
1 + βγ
) 1
δΓ (1 − γk)
cL
1−γβ
δΓ γ
b
γβ
δΓ
(κyθ)
β
δΓ
n(θ) =
(
Aβ
1 + βγ
) 1
Γ (1 − γk)
cL
β(1−γk)
δΓ γ
b
βγ+Γ
Γ
(κyθ)
β
Γ .
Here Γ ≡ (1 − βγ) − β(1−γk)δ > 0. Firms with higher revenue (due to a better productivity draw) choose
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a higher screening threshold and sample more workers. This, in turn, raises their wage, because they hire a
higher quality workforce. Note that a drop in the screening cost from cL to cM indicates a jump upwards in
both. All of the firm’s decisions depend on its initial productivity draw.
In equilibrium, we define the key productivity cut-offs θd and θ∗: Only firms with a productivity draw of
θd or higher will enter production and only firms with a productivity draw of θ∗ or higher will enter production
and pay the fixed cost to attract multinational investment and lower their screening costs.
Free entry implies zero expected profit, i.e.
ΠL(θd) = fd,
where the superscript L denotes a locally owned firm, and Π refers to firm revenue net of variable costs. We
implicitly define θ∗ as the productivity level at which the firm is indifferent between investing or not:
ΠL(θ∗) = ΠM (θ∗) − fm.
The last condition for sectoral equilibrium is the free-entry condition, which (together with the assumption
of Pareto distributed productivity draws) also allows us to derive the implicit functional relationship between
θd and θ∗:
fd
∫ ∞
θd
[(
θ
θd
) β
Γ
− 1
]
dGθ(θ) + fm
∫ ∞
θ∗
[(
θ
θ∗
) β
Γ
− 1
]
dGθ(θ) = fe
and
(θd)z =
fd
(z− βΓ )
β
Γ
fe
θzmin
− fmθ∗z
.
The two cut-off equations and the free-entry condition are used to solve for θd, θ∗ and A.
A.1 Direct wage effect
In order to examine the direct treatment effect, we first consider the wage paid by the marginal MNE (that is
one with a productivity draw of θ∗) when its ownership changes from domestic to foreign. In this framework
this premium is simply a function of the screening cost ratio, which is by definition always positive:
wm
wd
=
(
cL
cM
) k(1−γβ)
δΓ
(A.3)
This is equation (1) in the main text. In addition, we can show that the direct treatment effect differs with
the presence of foreign firms by looking at the ratio of the average wage paid by foreign-owned firms w̄m and
by domestically owned firms w̄d.
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w̄m
w̄d
=
∫∞
θ∗
w(θ)dGθ(θ)∫ θ∗
θd
w(θ)dGθ(θ)
=
wm∗
wd
(
θd
θ∗
) βk
δΓ 1(
θd
θ∗
) βk
δΓ−z − 1
=
wm∗
wd
1
ρ−z − ρ− βkδΓ
Throughout our analysis we assume z > βkδΓ , ensuring a strictly positive value for the wage ratio. Here w
m∗ is
the wage paid by a firm with θ = θ∗ that chooses to lower its screening costs. Using (A.3) we can simplify the
ratio wm∗/wd further:
wm∗
wd
=
wd∗
wd
(
cL
cM
) k(1−γβ)
δΓ
= ρ−
kβ
δΓ
(
cL
cM
) k(1−γβ)
δΓ
Combining the last two expressions we arrive at
w̄m
w̄d
=
(
cL
cM
) k(1−γβ)
δΓ 1
ρ
kβ
δΓ−z − 1
This is equation (2) in the main text.
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B Empirical Appendix
Table A1: Cluster (geographic-industry grouping pair) classification used in this paper
Geographic
grouping
Constituent provinces Industry
grouping
Constituent sectors
1 Beijing and Tianjing 1 Food processing, production and
beverage
2 Shanghai 2 Textile, leather and garments
3 Liaonign and Shandong 3 Timber, furniture, paper and
printing
4 Jiangshu 4 Rubber and plastic
5 Fujian and Zhejiang 5 Ferrous and nonferrous metals
6 Guangdong and Hainan 6 Electric, electronics, telecommu-
nications and instruments
7 Neimenggu, Hebei and Shanxi 7 Chemical materials and chemical
products
8 Jilin, Heilongjiang 8 Medical and pharmaceutical
products
9 Jiangxi, Anhui 9 Non-metal mineral products
10 Qinghai, Henan, Ganshu, Shanxi, Hu-
nan, Ningxia, Hubei, Guangxi and Xin-
jiang
10 Metal products
11 Guizhou, Yunnan , Sichuan and
Chongqin
11 Machinery
12 Special purpose equipment
13 Transport equipment
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Table A2: Top and bottom 10 FDI attracting clusters in terms of employment share of foreign firms
Bottom 10 clusters
Geographic grouping Industry grouping Employment share of FDI Share of FDI firms
5 7 0.04 0.08
8 7 0.05 0.07
4 7 0.06 0.06
10 7 0.06 0.08
5 7 0.06 0.04
7 7 0.06 0.06
7 10 0.06 0.05
10 4 0.07 0.08
8 4 0.07 0.03
11 2 0.07 0.08
Top 10 clusters
3 12 0.43 0.54
2 4 0.43 0.61
2 13 0.43 0.63
6 11 0.44 0.47
2 2 0.44 0.51
9 5 0.48 0.71
6 4 0.49 0.70
4 6 0.54 0.72
2 1 0.55 0.69
6 2 0.56 0.72
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Table A3: Summary statistics from the first stage cluster-specific logit regressions and balancing tests
(N=127)
Marginal effects from cluster-specific logit regressions Balancing tests
Pre-treatment
covariates (in 2004)
Mean Median SD Min Max % of balanced clusters
Productivity 0.063 0.037 0.167 -0.320 0.579 100%
Productivity
growth
-0.099 -0.107 0.320 -1.3292 1.957 99.2%
Wages 1.342 1.326 0.565 -0.382 2.982 100%
Wages growth -0.501 -0.434 0.858 -7.756 0.454 98.4%
Size 0.318 0.319 0.161 -0.062 0.718 100%
Age -0.308 -0.303 0.253 -1.012 0.288 100%
Exports 2.783 2.648 1.622 -3.626 11.948 97.6%
Tax -0.769 -0.632 0.924 -6.572 0.671 100%
Benefits -1.496 -1.447 0.688 -3.283 0.221 100%
Notes: (i) Determinants of foreign ownership are estimated separately for each of the 127 clusters. (ii) The
last column gives the results from the covariate balancing test which consists of testing (at 10% level or lower)
for difference in the means of the covariates in treatment and control groups, conditional on the estimated
propensity score.
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Table A4: Summary statistics of estimated coefficients from doubly-robust regressions
(Equation (3))
Mean Median SD Min Max
Foreign ownership 0.217 0.213 0.056 0.083 0.377
Pre-treatment covariates:
Productivity 0.019 0.018 0.015 -0.022 0.087
Productivity growth -0.173 -0.174 0.055 -0.316 -0.036
Wages -0.017 -0.022 0.072 -0.204 0.539
Wages growth -0.012 -0.010 0.023 -0.091 0.053
Size 0.004 -0.006 0.142 -0.829 1.041
Age 0.007 0.008 0.012 -0.034 0.037
Exports -0.008 -0.006 0.021 -0.093 0.072
Tax 0.000 -0.010 0.075 -0.182 0.400
Benefits -0.008 -0.011 0.040 -0.118 0.099
Notes: (i) The estimated coefficients of the pre-treatment variables do not have any causal interpretation
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Table A5: Estimated coefficients and average marginal effects from cluster-level fractional
logit model and balancing tests results
Dependent variable: Estimated coefficients Marginal effects p-values from
Proportion of Foreign Firms balancing tests
Productivity -0.169 -0.026 0.444
(0.2983) (0.2990)
Productivity growth -0.271 -0.042 0.10
(0.5243) (0.5244)
Wage 1.535 0.240 0.185
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Wage growth 1.080 0.169 0.496
(0.1659) (0.1670)
Size 0.195 0.031 0.559
(0.0787) (0.0797)
Age -0.758 -0.118 0.410
(0.0158) (0.0165)
Tax -0.483 -0.075 0.389
(0.0016) (0.0019)
Benefit -0.129 -0.020 0.385
(0.2298) (0.2287)
Exports 1.417 0.221 0.948
(0.0064) (0.0067)
Share of state-owned firms 1.559 0.243 0.592
(0.1570) (0.1559)
# of foreign firms in region 0.212 0.033 0.941
(0.0005) (0.0004)
Observations 127
Notes: p-values in parentheses.
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Table A6: Direct, indirect and total causal effects of foreign ownership on wages
% of MNEs Causal effects
Direct effects Point estimate 95% confidence interval
10% 0.187 0.182 0.193
20% 0.206 0.205 0.208
30% 0.231 0.229 0.232
40% 0.260 0.259 0.262
50% 0.291 0.286 0.296
Indirect effects
10% 0.017 0.015 0.019
20% 0.010 0.005 0.015
30% -0.015 -0.024 -0.007
40% -0.053 -0.068 -0.039
50% -0.099 -0.120 -0.078
Total effects
10% 0.204 0.198 0.210
20% 0.216 0.211 0.221
30% 0.215 0.205 0.225
40% 0.207 0.192 0.222
50% 0.192 0.177 0.207
Notes: This table contains a selection of the estimates used to draw Figures 3 and 4.
53
